Using contests to generate innovation has and is widely used. Such contests often involve o¤ering a prize that depends upon the accomplishment (e¤ort). Using an all-pay auction as a model of a contest, we determine the optimal reward for inducing innovation. In a symmetric environment, we …nd that the reward should be set to c(x)=(c 0 (x) )
Introduction
Using contests to generate innovation has been around for hundreds of years.
In the 1700s, the Longitude prize of £ 20,000 o¤ered by the British Parliament induced John Harrison to invent the marine chronometer (see Sobel, 1996) .
More recently, the Ansari X-prize was a ten-million-dollar competition created to jump-start the space tourism industry by attracting the attention of the most talented entrepreneurs and rocket experts in the world. 1 Such R&D contests are an example of a competition in which all contestants, including those that do not win any reward (prize), incur costs as a result of their e¤orts but only the winner gets the reward. In such contests, the designer may often o¤er smaller prizes for lesser achievements. In fact, while the full longitude prize was given for determining longitude within 30 nautical miles, £ 10,000 was given for a method for determining longitude within 60 miles, and £ 15,000 for a method within 40 nautical miles. Another example with smaller prizes is where Net ‡ix o¤ers a prize for improving their movie recommendation system. 2 This prize increases if the improvement is more than 10%. 3 We model a contest as an all-pay auction. When the prize depends upon the result, this is equivalent to having a bid-dependent reward. Such environ- In this paper, we provide further normative analysis for environments with complete information. We look at the optimal rewards under complete information when the designer cares about both the largest e¤ort and the sum of the e¤orts by the participants. The designer wishes to maximize this expression net of the rewards paid out. We determine the designer's optimal bid-dependent reward structure to acheive this goal as a function of costs in both symmetric and asymmetric environments.
Interestingly, the solution under symmetry when the designer cares only about the highest e¤ort produces equivalent behavior to that in Che and aviation design. There was a competition between the fastest seaplanes held 11 times between 1913 and 1931. Each victory won a smaller prize and the full prize of 70,000 Franc prize would be given if the same club won three times in a row. When this happened by an English group (won by a forerunner to the Spit…re), the competition ceased. Gale (2003) where the …rms compete by choosing both e¤ort and price. In our paper, the solution under asymmetry is similar to that under symmetry except the rewards are a …rm speci…c function that …rm's costs. One may consider this problematic in the sense that the designer must know which …rm is which and bias the contest in favor one of the …rms. We address this issue by describing settings where this …rm speci…c reward structure can be replaced by a reward (to the winner) that depends upon both of the …rms'
e¤orts. In our setting, we consider a richer class of contests than considered by Che and Gale (2003) and as a result, in some cases, the optimal contest generates higher surplus for the designer than their solution of handicapping one …rm.
While in this paper we phrase the problem as designing a research contest, our analysis is applicable to many other scenarios that have such a winnertake-all form. For instance, many races o¤er prizes to the winners that depend upon time. Also, in a contest to receive a promotion at a company, the …rm may set the salary increase with the promotion conditional on the worker's performance. This paper would suggest how to structure these rewards.
Our paper is proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the general environment with the optimal rewards for symmetric case. Afterwards, in Section 3, we allow for asymmetry between …rms. Finally, in Section 4, we present the concluding remarks.
2 Symmetric Environment
Model
A buyer (designer) desires an innovation. There are n …rms that have potential to innovate. Firms can create an innovation of value x (to the designer) for a cost c(x). This value x includes external bene…ts generated by the contest. 4 We assume c(0) 0; c 0 0; c 00 > 0, and is common knowledge. 5 Furthermore, we assume there exists an x such that x > c(x). The buyer can design a contest where the reward depends upon the bid of the …rm. He does so by choosing a reward function R(x) that depends upon the winning bid (it could be constant). We assume that R must be continuous with R(0) 0.
6
The buyer wishes to maximize:
x i R(maxfx 1 ; :::; x n g)]:
At this point we would like to further motivate our study of contests rather than other mechanisms: One alternative could be to run a Vickrey auction where the …rms compete by o¤ering potential innovations and then the winning …rm would create the innovation promised. Another could be making a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er to a single …rm (or multiple …rms when 4 We assume that the designer has the potential to capture all the external bene…ts accrued to the winner with a contract signed before the contest (such as with the show Pop Idol). 5 While we assume the designer knows c, we also assume that c is not veri…able in court. 6 The assumption of continuity of R is natural, since even a discontinuous reward function is equivalent to a continuous reward function with a minimum amount of noise. Consider the case that each x i has a noise " that a¤ects the …nal result. (For instance, there could be a slight wind in the 100 m dash.) In this case, the actual reward would be e R(x i ) E[R(x i + ")] and is continuous. > 0). Our reasons are as follows. First, there may be external bene…ts (publicity) for both the designer and winning …rm for running a contest. 7 Second, as mentioned in Scotchmer (2004, chapter 2), without a contest, there is a hold-up type problem when the ex-post payment depends upon the …rm delivering a future innovation of a speci…c quality. 8 Finally, in practice, contests are commonly used in a plethora of economic activities,
while Scotchmer (2004, chapter 2) points out that to her knowledge (and ours) that a Vickrey auction has never been used in procuring an innovation.
Thus, studying the optimal contest is a worthwhile endeavor.
Analysis
As long as there exists an x such that R(x) > c(x), there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 9 In such a case, however, there will be a symmetric mixedstrategy equilibrium where each …rm chooses x according to a cumulative, atomless (except possibly at 0) distribution F .
Proposition 1
In the optimal design, the buyer sets
This generates a surplus of n n 1
7 In 1959, Feynmann o¤ered a prize for the development of a small motor and reducing written text that could …t the encyclopedia on a pin. The innovations themselves were useless, but the challenge provided inspiration for nanotechnology. 8 It is reasonable to assume that the designer can commit to paying a prize (for instance by setting up a foundation) and avoid a hold-up problem the other way. 9 When this condition does not hold, the pure-strategy equilibrium has no …rm entering and the buyer earning zero surplus.
Proof. The designer's expected surplus can be rewritten as
Similar to Kaplan et al. (2003) , the …rms will have zero expected pro…ts.
Since it is a mixed strategy equilibrium, the …rms must be indi¤erent over all x in the support of F . Hence,
By integrating we get:
Substituting this into the designer's objective yields
We can now do a change of variables so that we are integrating over F (rather
Now we can independently choose our x(F ) to maximize the integrand. Thus,
. This is true for whenever c 0 (x) > 0. No one would choose
x such that c 0 (x) < 0 since in equilibrium, there would be no chance of winning. Hence, as long as reward is …nite, it will not a¤ect behavior.
The expression for the surplus is generated by substitution (for example,
Note the lower limit of the integral yielding the surplus is 0 if there is no x such that c 0 (x) = 0.
Remark 1 While we have thus talked about a single reward for the winner, if there is an x > 0 such that c 0 (x) = 0, the optimal reward would involve in…nite rewards. This can be avoided since a designer can implement the optimal reward structure with any two functions L and R such that the winner receives R and the losers receive L where (c
for x x where c 0 (x ) = .
With just a reward we have R(x) = x 2 =(2x 1) (for x > 1=2 and 0 elsewhere). In such a case x = 1=2: We can also have L(x) = c(x) 2x = 2x 3 for x < 1=2 and L(x) = 1=4 for
Comparison to Che and Gale (2003)
In Che and Gale (2003), a buyer also wishes to acquire an innovation that can be of varying quality. There, the buyer designs a competition where …rms expend e¤ort to innovate where a higher e¤ort results in a higher quality of innovation. After innovating each …rm speci…es a price to the buyer. The buyer then chooses the …rm o¤ering the highest surplus (quality minus price).
The winning …rm receives payment while all …rms bear the cost of their sunk e¤ort. In this setup, the buyer cares only about the …rm o¤ering the largest surplus and derives no surplus from e¤ort put forth by the other …rms, i.e., = 0.
In the simplest version of the Che-Gale model, each …rm i chooses e¤ort
where is the probability that the other …rms choose a surplus lower than one's own). Substituting the constraint into the maximand, we get
. The …rm will optimize over the choices of x and p which implies (from the FOCs)
The zero pro…t condition of the …rm implies that
The behavior induced and payo¤s are identical to our solution for the case when = 0.
Intuitively, this works out to be the same since the …rms in the Che and
Gale model optimize over e¤ort and price given a speci…c level of surplus o¤ered. In our model, the designer optimizes the trade-o¤ between value of the e¤ort (to the designer) and its cost (to the …rm) for a given probability of winning (note an e¤ort is worthless to the designer if it is not the highest).
For the symmetric environment, each mechanism has its own bene…ts.
The Che and Gale mechanism has the advantage that the designer does not need to know the cost function beforehand which our mechanism requires for determining the rewards. The Che and Gale mechanism has the disad-vantage that o¤ equilibrium, the buyer may have to purchase the inferior innovation since it o¤ers him a lower price. This could be politically di¢ cult and precludes the possibility of renegotiation on price.
Properties of the optimal reward
Remark 2 The optimal reward function may assume many forms: increasing, decreasing, have both increasing and decreasing parts, or be constant.
The remark is shown through a series of examples when = 0 for simplicity. Such examples also exist for > 0.
Example 2 A strictly increasing reward function: n = 2, c(x) = x where
For such a cost, the optimal reward is R(x) = " e¤ort, it has a 1=2 chance of winning a reward of 2 and it costs the …rm 1. Also note that we implicitly assume that a …rm can stay out and not pay c(0).
Remark 3
The optimal R(x) is constant if and only if there is a …xed cost and c(x) = e x=r+ r where r > 0; ln( r) < ln(r(1 + )) and R(x) = r:
; if R(x) is constant and equal to r, we have
. This yields c(x) = e x=r+ r. Since F (x) n 1 = c 0 (x) = c(x)=r; we have F (0) 0 if e r 0. Also, we must have F (0) < 1; which implies we must have e r < r. These two inequalities yield the bounds on in the remark.
Remark 4 When = 0, multiplying the costs by a constant does not e¤ect the optimal R(x).
One may intuitively think that doubling costs would entail an increase of the optimal rewards; however, since
, there is no change. This is due to the result that if cost is doubled, then it is optimal to have F doubled (a decrease in the e¤ort). In order to induce this, R(x) should stay the same. This is clearly not true when > 0.
Asymmetric Environment
Now assume that there are two …rms that di¤er by their cost functions c 1 (x), c 2 (x) where c 1 (x) c 2 (x): For now, assume that the designer can make a separate reward o¤er to either …rm: R 1 (x) and R 2 (x): Assume that the buyer chooses rewards such that the equilibrium has both …rms making a positive e¤ort.
Under these assumptions, again there must be a mixed-strategy equilibrium which we denote by F 1 (x) and F 2 (x).
Lemma 1 In the optimal design, …rms make zero pro…ts.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us say that the two reward functions R 1 and R 2 are optimal and induce behaviour F 1 and F 2 : Assume that the equilibrium is such that R 1 (x)F 2 (x) c 1 (x) = 0 and R 2 (x)F 1 (x) c 2 (x) = : (Note that in equilibrium at least one must make zero pro…ts.)
and induces the same equilibrium distribution functions. Hence, there is a contradiction to the initial assumption that R 1 and R 2 are optimal for the designer.
When pro…ts are zero the objective of the designer can be written as the sum of total social welfare and the expected sum of e¤orts multiplied by .
Let us look at the case were there are cost functions c 1 (x) and c 2 (x): The objective function is then:
The designer's problem is then max ).
Proof. Let us do a change of variables to choose x(F 1 ) and F 2 (F 1 ). Now the maximization problem becomes
Choosing x() pointwise leads to the following FOC:
Choosing F 0 2 (F 1 ) pointwise leads to the second FOC:
Note that in order to do this last step, we have to use integration by parts to rewrite the integral
Let us now write the second FOC by writing F in terms of x:
Substituting this into the …rst FOC yields
. Using the indi¤erence conditions of the …rms yields the optimal reward functions.
The conditions c (where a; b > 1). We have
where
and
Notice that such a reward structure requires that the designer not only knows which …rm has which cost function, but is also able to openly discriminate against one of the …rms. Such favoritism could be problematic politically. It would be much easier and more elegant if there could be a single reward function. We, hence, proceed to try and construct a reward function that depends not only on one's own e¤ort but also on that of the other …rm and which in expectation replicates, in equilibrium, the two separate reward functions.
Remark 5
The optimal design can sometimes be implemented by a single reward function that depends upon both e¤orts.
Proof. We wish to create a reward function R(x h ; x l ) This reward function represents the reward paid to the …rm with the highest e¤ort and depends upon both the high and low e¤ort levels x h and x l . The expectation of this reward function should yield the individual expected reward functions, namely,
Rewriting yields
Substituting the functions used in our example yields
The solution to these two equations is R(x h ; x l ) =
Note that for the example in the above proof the exponent on x h is always positive and the exponent on x l is always less than 1 and could be negative.
We can also compute the expected pro…t for the above example which is For the weak buyer
1=2 : Likewise for the strong buyer, when p is not binding, we have i (s) = 2s: Using the probability of winning i ; we can determine the strategy G i of each player:
We can now compute the expected pro…t: 
Conclusion
We have examined the optimal design of rewards in a contest with complete information. We …nd a simple rule for setting the optimal rewards in the symmetric case. This allows the designer to simply choose the best design and pay the winner according to the prespeci…ed reward. With asymmetry, it is optimal to have di¤erent …rms receive di¤erent rewards. We show it might be possible, for some environments, to replicate this with a common joint reward function that depends upon both e¤orts. This design method yielded "better outcomes"then previously used mechanisms. 
